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This case study will analyse the nature of pastoral conflict and its implications 
for the border areas of Kenya and Uganda. While insecurity and conflict in 
these areas is often characterised as arising from competition over scarce 
resources, there are broader dimensions to these conflicts. These revolve 
around a long history of social, economic and political exclusion from the 
centre. As a result of weak state penetration in these remote border regions 
pastoralist communities retain a limited and negative experience of the state.  
 
The state’s role in service delivery in two areas- the provision of security to 
pastoral communities and support to pastoral livelihoods- is on the whole 
poor. In Kenya and Uganda the state responses to conflict in pastoral areas 
have historically been characterised by an indiscriminate and aggressive 
military response that has alienated pastoral communities. Aside from these 
periodic security interventions, pastoral communities largely fend for 
themselves and in this context the role of arms, both as a means of protection 
and as livelihood assets, becomes important. This section will examine these 
issues in more detail.  
 
With respect to support to pastoral livelihoods, the analysis will illustrate that 
systematic marginalistion of pastoral communities from development 
opportunities has deepened inequality. There are signs that the policy 
environment in Kenya is improving and beginning to address some of the 
structural drivers of inequality while progress in Uganda has been slower and 
significant challenges remain. 
 
The paper will outline the pattern of development assistance in pastoral 
regions in the two countries and the extent to which progress on human 
development has been achieved. The paper argues that insecurity and 
conflict combined with limited investment in pastoral livelihoods systems from 
the centre (in Uganda the settlement of pastoral communities remains a 
strong development objective despite the proven ineffectiveness of such 
strategies) present equal challenges to human development in the two 
countries.  
 
The paper will analyse the different responses to pastoral conflict in Kenya 
and Uganda. This section will cover macro-level policy responses such as the 
Pastoralist PRSP process and arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) programme in 
Kenya.  In Uganda, the Northern Uganda disarmament programme and the 
Uganda Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) will be analysed. At a micro 
level NGO sponsored grassroots peacebuilding initiatives (such as the 
AU/IBAR Karamoja Cluster peacebuilding programme and the Wajir Peace 




Background to conflict in pastoral areas 
 The border areas of northern Kenya and Uganda have, over the last three or 
four decades, been the arena for a variety of ‘low intensity’ conflicts, some of 
which are linked to wider cross-border and regional conflicts. The roots of 
these conflicts lie in a combination of political, socio-economic and ecological 
factors. These include: A long history of economic and social marginalisation 
from central authority; increased competition over resources; reduced access 
to land, water and other natural resources due to increasing demographic and 
environmental pressure, and reduced access to credit, markets and extension 
services. 
 
Ecologically, the arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya and Uganda are 
characterised by the steady erosion of the natural resource and social asset 
base from which households and communities construct their (predominantly 
pastoral) livelihoods. This is further exacerbated by seasonal variations or 
shocks, such as drought. Pastoral livelihood systems have adapted to these 
ecological patterns through the development of highly resilient production 
systems: The nature of pastoral livelihoods demands a high degree of mobility 
guided by the need for access to water and grazing land without deference to 
state borders.   
 
These systems have been significantly eroded, as a result of colonial and 
post-colonial legal definitions of land ownership and resource use. The 
increasing emphasis on individual rather than communal property rights has 
led to increasing restrictions on population movement and grazing rights, the 
foundations of pastoral economy, which has in turn undermined historic 
coping strategies and increased the vulnerability of pastoral communities. As 
a result, communities no longer retain the capabilities, activities and resources 
required to secure a minimal means of living. 
 
In addition to these factors, the proximity of these border regions to wider 
regional conflict: Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia
1 has made access to small arms 
relatively easy. In a context of increasing vulnerability at the household level 
both from insecurity and economic decline, small arms are regarded as 
household or community assets.  This is the case in Turkana and other 
districts in northern Kenya where communities acquire weapons as a means 
of protecting, replacing or accumulating assets from both cross-border and 










                                             
1 Uganda of course had its own civil war. Pastoral conflict and violence in the subregion is historically linked to the violence that 
accompanied the state formation in the colonial era
2. The genesis of these conflicts was 
triggered by colonial state policy. The gazetting and appropriation of large parts of the 
pastoralists’ communal lands, as was the case in Uganda, triggered contradictions and 
conflict between pastoralists and the state. The violence meted out by the authorities pushed 
these communities to the fringes of the state and led to their being marginalized. This 
contributed to the strong impulse among pastoralists to acquire firearms to match or counter 
state violence.  
 
The British authorities administered emergency law to rule the sub-region’s people 
(northeastern Uganda, northern Kenya, and southeastern Sudan). The colonial authority’s 
quest to pacify the people led them to neglect any meaningful investment in fields of social 
and economic development. Lord Harcourt’s observation provides a clear illustration of this: 
“It appears to me both dangerous and unremunerative for the Governor of Uganda to 
undertake the administration of a country which is not easy to access from headquarters and 
which has no great resources.”  
 
Imposing fixed internal divisions (for example, northern Kenya was a closed district in colonial 
times) and international borders without regard for livelihood systems of pastoral communities 
had devastating results. It is clear that colonial borders – and the way they have been 
administered since then – are a crucial factor behind conflicts in border areas: Awuondo 
warns that “the pastoralist understanding and response to ecological pressures was 
systematically eroded by colonialism.  This was affected by drawing ethnic and national 
boundaries as well as restricting cattle movements” 
3. 
 
Civil wars over the years in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda have led to proliferation of 
small arms and light weapons.  The wide availability of arms, apart from being devastating in 
terms of human loss, has altered the cultural foundations of many communities – erosion of 
traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms in the face of arms-bearing youth being one of the 
most significant examples. Given the livelihood insecurity of communities in border areas, 
availability of arms has provided the means for communities to seek alternative livelihoods 
(inevitably violent ones) such as livestock rustling and banditry. 
 
The phenomenon of livestock warlord rivalry has now emerged, most notably in the Kenya, 
Sudan, Uganda border area (particularly in the Pokot and Turkana communities). In Kenya, 
the Pokot have raided the Tugen, Marakwet, and Keiyo; internationally they have raided the 
Turkana and Karamajong of Uganda and the Toposa of Ethiopia. The warlords command 
small and well-equipped armies and, as Osamba reports, “have acquired more sophisticated 
weapons [as bandits] than those of government security forces; bandits have become de 
facto administrators in northern Kenya.”
4 
 
Rebel activities along the Kenya-Ethiopia border further complicate the nature of conflict. The 
frequent tensions along the Kenya-Ethiopia border are largely rooted in the belief that the 
Oromo Liberation Front often uses Kenya as a base for retreat from Ethiopian forces following 
armed engagements.  In response, Ethiopian militias often cross over into Kenya in hot 
pursuit of OLF rebels and end up in violent clashes with communities in Kenya. There are 
several reported incidents of these sorts of incursions and one reported incident in which 
several Kenyan policemen were killed and one captured and taken across the border. These 
incidents put a great deal of strain on relations between Kenya and Ethiopia. 
Extract from Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa, Ciru Mwaura & 
Susanne Schmeidl (eds), Red Sea Press, 2001 
                                             
2 See Peter Adwok Nyaba and Peter Otim, Conflicts in Pastoral Areas along Borders: The 
Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan. CEWARN Consultancy Report (London: FEWER, 2001). 
3 Odegi C. Awuondo, Life in the Balance: Ecological Sociology of Turkana Nomads, (Nairobi: 
ACTS Press, 1992).  




The role of the state 
 
Conflict in pastoral areas is often associated with their marginal location and 
weak state penetration. Pastoralists are seen as not only physically distant 
and occupying peripheral areas, but also as politically and culturally marginal. 
Their presumed distance from modern institutions and from the controlling 
action of the state is often accepted as a self-evident explanation for 
widespread violence. The situation is much more complex and closer analysis  
(as highlighted above) shows that the colonial and post-colonial state has had 
a direct role in increasing the insecurity of pastoral communities. For example, 
in Kenya, several shortcomings have characterised previous government 
responses to insecurity in the arid areas
5:  
 
  Lack of response: Frequently, there has been no response for ‘normal’ 
killing and raiding; a certain level of inter-clan or inter-ethnic killing 
among pastoral communities was often considered usual and 
acceptable; 
  Delayed response: District administrations have complained that they 
lack sufficient resources such as fuel and ‘night out’ allowances to send 
timely responses; 
  Indiscriminate force: Numerous cases where indiscriminate force was 
deployed in notorious army or police ‘operations’. These tended to 
effect collective punishment rather than apprehending culprits of 
raiding. Such responses rarely brought lasting results in terms of 
ending the ongoing cycle of conflict; 
  Ineffective formal justice: In addition, where perpetrators of murder, 
banditry or raiding were processed through the formal state justice 
system, there have been countless cases of the individual escaping 
justice through bribing police or magistrates;  
  Lack of motivation: Security personnel have often had limited appetite 
or motivation for stemming stem inter-clan or inter-ethnic fighting.  
 
The same is true of the role of the state in Uganda, most vividly illustrated in 
the government’s failed attempts at forcible civilian disarmament in northern 
Uganda without providing credible security guarantees. So long as the state 
remains unable to provide credible alternative security mechanisms to 
communities, self-armament and enlisting in a militia group represents a 
‘rational’ adaptation to violent conflict for many communities (Collinson, 2003). 
 
Development assistance and pastoral livelihoods 
 
In Kenya, arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) cover 80 per cent of the total land 
surface and provide subsistence economy to 25 per cent of the population 
who are mainly pastoralists and agro-pastoralists (NDP 2002). These areas 
have the highest incidences of poverty and the lowest levels of access to 
                                             
5 Conflict Reduction in arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya: Lessons learned, Oxfam GB, 2002 basic services
6. While Uganda has made record progress in human 
development in the last 15 years, the notion of 'national development' is 
problematic given the gap between the north and the rest of the country
7. The 
northern part of Uganda remains the poorest with 63% of the population 
estimated to be living below the poverty line in 2003.   
 
Most analysis cites conflict and insecurity as the major reason for chronic 
underdevelopment. There is no doubt that conflict undermines resource 
effectiveness or that improvements will only be possible once security is 
established. That said, there is a long history of social, political and economic 
marginalisation from the centre that underpins the poverty and insecurity in 
northern Kenya and Uganda. 
 
At a macro-level, the state has been reluctant to engage with pastoral 
economy and livelihoods. State-led development interventions in pastoral 
regions have historically been in direct conflict with the pastoral way of life. 
Pastoral livelihoods have often been regarded as primitive and unproductive. 
It is only relatively recently that the Kenyan government has moved away from 
overt attempts at settling pastoral communities. This still remains a policy 
objective of the Ugandan government.  
 
This history of marginalisation was reflected in the Interim PRSP in Kenya, 
which failed to reflect the priorities of pastoral communities. As a result a 
Pastoralist Thematic Group (PTG) was created to develop thinking on poverty 
reduction in pastoral regions of Kenya: “The poverty reduction strategy paper 
provides an initial articulation of the government of Kenya’s response to the 
urgent need to reduce the incidence of poverty in Kenya. As this is the highest 
among pastoralist households, (60%), the PTG has prepared an 
implementation matrix to accompany the group’s paper for greater articulation 
in the final PRSP plan”
 8. 
  
The Uganda Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) cites armed conflict as a 
decisive factor in the impoverishment of northern Uganda and focuses on 
conflict resolution as a key element of the action plan. This analysis does not 
take into account the historical roots of underdevelopment in the north or 
focus on the role of central economic and development policy in contributing 
to the chronic poverty in the north. 
 
At a micro-level, the increase/intensification of violent conflict as a result of 
developmental programmes and policies, or their absence or ineffectiveness 
has in many cases, skewed access to natural resources, accentuate existing 
levels of competition and concentrate resource degradation within particular 
                                             
6 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for the period 2000-2003: Government of Kenya, 
June 2000 
7 Two Africas? Two Ugandas: An African democratic developmental state or another 'failed 
state'? Timothy M Shaw 
 
8 Pastoralist Thematic Group on Poverty Reduction, Ministry of Finance, Republic of Kenya, 
March 2001. areas. The following analysis provides a snapshot of the nature of 
development interventions in pastoral regions. 
 The Growth in Pastoral Poverty in Karamoja 
 
Reduced mobility:  A key state objective has been to limit mobility of pastoralists in 
Karamoja. A mobile lifestyle has been equated with backwardness and a threat to state 
security. County, district and international boundaries have had the effect of restricting mobile 
resource utilisation, the optimal pastoral response to unpredictable rainfall. Development of 
new water sources has repeatedly been linked with this objective of reducing mobility and 
encouraging settlement. Water is frequently perceived as the simple technocratic solution: 
water will develop the people because they do not have enough for their livestock. It will stop 
people having to move to other districts to look for it. Part of the rationale for the construction 
of dams and valley tanks by the colonial government was that it would limit the need for 
herders to cross the Karamoja boundaries. This view remains largely in tact. In 1995, the 
President gave a directive that the ‘Karimojong’ should remain within their district boundaries 
and the emergency rehabilitation of valley dams was planned to facilitate this (Watson, 1997: 
11). 
 
Unplanned water impacting on seasonal grazing patterns:  In fact, pastoralist 
movement relates to a range of factors, the most fundamental, along with water, being 
availability of grazing. Provision of new water points does not obviate the need for mobility in 
arid environments to exploit the unpredictable distribution of grazing resources. At the same 
time, the introduction of new water sources in pastoral areas can have negative effects on 
rangeland. Water development during the colonial period apparently led to over-concentration 
and overgrazing of livestock in certain areas. An FAO team after independence advised a halt 
in construction of dams and tanks until a review was carried out. This was not done and dam 
construction continued (Mamdani et al, 1992: 52). Seasonal grazing patterns in Karamoja 
involve leaving some areas ungrazed during the wet season so they can recover and provide 
grazing during the dry season. The siting of new water points which fails to take account of 
such customary practices can undermine existing grazing patterns and result in permanent 
grazing throughout the year. It would appear that most new livestock water points introduced 
since the colonial period have not been based on an understanding of grazing patterns or 
planned in consultation with customary authorities. 
 
Increase in areas of cultivation in rangeland: Promotion of sedentary, mainly agricultural, 
livelihoods has been the de facto aim of most state and non-state interventions. There has 
been an expansion of agriculture in the more fertile areas, such as Karenga in Dodoth, 
Namalu in Pian, and Iriir in Bokora, which were previously dry season grazing areas. Already 
by the 1960s, land under cultivation had increased up to five times in some areas since the 
introduction of the ox-plough (Dyson Hudson, 1996: 43). This has clearly involved benefits to 
some households in terms of increased agricultural production. However, increase in 
agriculture, has meant reduction in grazing land. A challenge lies in finding an effective 
balance between these two land uses. This has been elusive to date given the pre-occupation 
of state and development agencies with agriculture to the exclusion of pastoralism. 
 
Gazetting of wildlife and forest reserves:  36% of the total land area in Karamoja is 
currently gazetted as protected areas for a national park and wildlife and forest reserves. 
Grazing, settlement and cultivation is prohibited in these areas, although these restrictions are 
not currently enforced in all areas. This is discussed further in section 3.3. 
 
Shrinking rangeland under increased grazing pressure:  The effect of the above has 
been a reduction in the grazing areas available to pastoralists and increased livestock 
pressure on the remaining areas of grazing. Mamdani et al (1992) conclude that the twentieth 
century saw a dramatic change in the vegetation ecology of Karamoja with deterioration in the 
status of grazing land. 
 
Inappropriate and inadequate access to services:  Service delivery in Karamoja is the 
weakest in Uganda and often nappropriate to pastoral livelihoods. Notable are the poor and 
declining provision of veterinary services and lowest primary school enrolment in the country. 
 
Lack of alternatives to pastoral livelihoods:  Reducing per capita herds make imperative 
the development of alternative livelihoods to pastoralism. But the poor state of basic infrastructure and isolation of Karamoja have contributed to the lack of such alternatives. 
 




Responding to conflict in pastoral areas 
 
State failure in the provision of security and justice for civilians has led to an 
increase in grassroots peacebuilding initiatives often supported by 
international agencies. An investment in these sorts of initiatives has often 
provided the necessary stable conditions for the delivery of services. In their 
peacebuilding interventions, international agencies along with communities 
appear to be attempting to fill the security vacuum in remote border regions.  
 
These initiatives have moved well beyond providing the space for dialogue, to 
the creation of ad hoc but innovative security structures known as peace 
committees. These often assume policing and judicial functions such as rapid 
response, investigation and dispute resolution have, in some cases, become 
the de facto framework for the provision of security and justice at a community 
level.  
 
Community-based peace-building and conflict management is increasingly 
being mainstreamed into many standard development projects in conflict-
affected areas, including the rehabilitation and delivery of social services, 
livelihoods and rural development programmes. The most advanced work on 
this has taken place in northern Kenya. In this context, district peace 
committees in arid districts have played a pivotal role in providing an interface 
between local administration, elders and civil society organisations in 
responding to insecurity. 
 
This was certainly the thinking that informed the large World Bank funded 
Government’s Arid and Semi-arid Lands Resource Management Programme 
(ALRMP) operating in the pastoral regions of Kenya. In response to endemic 
conflict and insecurity the ALRMP introduced grass-roots peacebuilding as a 




  Traditional authorities particularly elders are now increasingly involved 
in responding to incidents of murder, stock raiding and assaults, with 
and sometimes without, government security personnel. There is an 
increase in elders and security forces working jointly to deal with 
security incidents. Security forces in some arid districts are more 
disposed than before to consult and liase with elders and communities. 
In some districts, there has been increased speed and commitment of 
district security response in tandem with these customary approaches.  
 
  While customary approaches – such as payment of fines and ‘blood’ 
compensation – have always continued to operate in arid districts, the 
                                             
9 Conflict Reduction in arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya: Lessons learned, Oxfam GB, 2002 change is an increase in their de facto recognition by the state, 
sometimes instead of formal justice processes of arrest, trial and 
imprisonment, where this felt to better guarantee overall security. 
Administration has played a role in actively supporting and enforcing 
these customary approaches – for example through forced confiscation 
of stock or holding a culprit in custody until ‘blood’ compensation is 
paid then releasing him/her without charge.  
 
  In some cases, there has been a shift to collective responsibility for 
security among elders and chiefs of an area. Where banditry or raiding 
occurs, the relevant chief and elders are expected to deliver the guns 
used in the incident, and return stock, or face confiscation of livestock 
from the clan as a whole. In some parts of northern Kenya, particularly 
north Eastern province (e.g. Wajir) this appears to have been effective 




Overall, government commitment and response to security remains 
inadequate in the border areas of Kenya and Uganda. Therefore, while there 
have been improvements in security in some districts with the introduction of 
peace committees, their increased role may have exacerbated government 
retreat from core security responsibilities.  
 
The peacebuilding terrain is highly complex and variable in terms of its impact 
and effectiveness. The success of these initiatives is dependent on the type of 
conflict that is being addressed, in particular, the degree to which the wider 
civil war influences local conflict dynamics. It is, therefore, important to have a 
clear sense of where grassroots initiatives are most effective and ensure we 
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